> The Yell wrote:

> >>Why?  Deterrence is a purely defensive strategy, claiming that if an opponent fires nuclear weapons, they will respond with their own weapons.  In a world where all nuclear weapons are deterrence-tooled weapons, the world is actually quite safe because mutually assured destruction is guaranteed.<<

On the contrary, such a posture would open the world to widespread conventional warfare.  the 1970s, which were the era of greatest goodwill between NATO and Warsaw Pact, was quite explosive.

1: Relatively, the 1970's could have been much worse.
Russia and China were in open conflict a year before, yet neither committed to full scale war due to the fear of nuclear retaliation (one note to prove my point: A year before, there are allegations that Russia had asked the United States if a nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear facilities would trigger a US response... the US came to China's defense, so the Soviets couldn't follow through).
The Vietnam War took the form of a proxy war on the parts of China and Russia, similarly to the Afghanistan war.
Your examples of conflicts during this period will involve either nuclear vs. non-nuclear powers and/or non-nuclear vs. non-nuclear nations, which aren't applicable to this debate since nobody is referring to fully denuclearizing Britain, or are referring to small conflicts which, because of deterrence, never erupted into open conflict.
2: Correlation doesn't imply causation.  How does the scenario above lead to widespread conventional war?

>>For deterrence to be effective, both leaders must have the understanding that each side fears the weapons of the other side.  If Britain is fielding offensive weapons which are able to nullify the opponent's capability to launch a second strike, Britain has nothing to fear from Russian nuclear weapons.<<

No. For deterrence to be effective, one side's independent offense must have a capability to do damage to the other side.  At the point where, say, China has the power to cripple the US Pacific fleet in combat with the Chinese mainland, the US is deterred from policies that might inflame a Chinese response.  There may, or may not, be a contrary deterrent of Chinese aggression out of respect for US combat potential.  There is no "mutual" deterrence, just concurrent and opposite deterrence.

1: So in your scenario where China can take down the US Pacific fleet, China's only reason for not being aggressive is... because they're nice guys, respectful of their enemies?  So if bad guys have a technological edge in nuclear weapons, they'll suddenly just decide they like peace?  From the perspective of that leader, the choice to not go to war in a scenario where that leader is assured victory against a strong aggressor, is utterly irrational.  In the case of nuclear weapons, where there wouldn't be issues like reconstruction to deal with, it's even more irrational to let a weak enemy survive.
Even if your scenario is true, believing the scenario means that war is inevitable under that framework.  Only a belief in mutually assured destruction has the slightest chance of obtaining peace.  The adoption of your theory creates a self-prophecizing nightmare scenario.
2: Your theory runs contrary to pretty much every nuclear strategy scholar in 50 years.  Back up your stance with some kind of justification (i.e. why mutual deterrence does not exist) or, simply put, your argument is overwhelmed by the hundreds of military scholars on deterrence.  The theory is fairly straightforward: In a scenario where two nations know that their use of nuclear weapons will result in their own annihilation, they desire to prevent that conflict from occurring due to the certainty of failure.
3: If mutually assured destruction does not exist as a theory of deterrence, how do you explain the fact at a large scale war never occurred between the US and USSR, the US and China, or the USSR and China?
4: Upon reading that... you might be simply questioning my use of the word "Deterrence" instead of "mutually assured destruction" in:
"For deterrence to be effective, one side's independent offense must have a capability to do damage to the other side."
If that's the case, fine, I meant mutually assured destruction.  Regardless of the semantic strawman you're throwing out, the thesis still stands.

>>In any realist interpretation of politics, a nation with the capability to first strike their opponent would do exactly that.<<

Realistically quite the opposite.

No, realist as in "a realist framework of international politics," meaning "the political system is a state of anarchy, nations primarily focus on promoting their own interests first."

>>Knowing this, Russia's only chance for survival is a last ditch effort at a near-suicidal first strike against Britain, or at the very least operating under a high-alert status that risks triggering accidental nuclear wars. <<

Unless of course Russia knows that Britain has a totally defensive posture, in which case, Russia can declare for the greatest nuclear drawdown in world history, and at the same time, invade and partition its neighbors with conventional forces, without opposition from the UK.

1: The fact that Russia keeps its nuclear forces on launch-on-warning status empirically disproves your stance.
2: If there is no defensive role for submarines, then it undermines the assumption that Britain has a totally defensive posture, by the very fact that those weapons exist.

>>At the point where a nuclear weapon no longer provides a stable deterrent force, assuming those weapons are not intended for any first strike plans, what is their use?<<

Strategic bombardment of the enemy, first, last, second, in between, post-armistice, what have you.

So... you're admitting that the submarines are purely offensive, and not deterrent forces?  Great, that means I win.

nukes didnt help the US in 'nam. they didnt help the Soviets in Afghanistan & they didn't deter the Argies from invading the British falklands.

Hez, that is because the USA, USSR and UK are/were all rational nations. Let's face it, you have to be pretty insane to start firing nukes around even (or especially?) against non-nuclear armed nations. Which I guess leads to a contradiction in the effectiveness of MAD. MAD only works when the nations involved are rationally controlled. But if those nations are rational then they wouldn't use their nuclear weapons anyway. However if your "opponent" is not rational, then they may not pay any attention to MAD and just nuke you anyway.

"MAD only works when the nations involved are rationally controlled. But if those nations are rational then they wouldn't use their nuclear weapons anyway. However if your "opponent" is not rational, then they may not pay any attention to MAD and just nuke you anyway."
They are rational to the point that they are not suicidal.

"Come on, someone argue with me!  You know, like the people who were favoring the other side of the argument?"
Anything for you zarfy, anything!

lol, gl with your essay.

"they didn't deter the Argies from invading the British falklands"

and why not?

@justinian:
Being a volunteer can get you a better job. It depends on what you volunteer for. But a lot of student-leaders work for free. Yet every single person who did it in my home town has a job high-up.